| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ArduinoBLE enables Bluetooth Low Energy connectivity on certain Arduino models. Versions prior to 2.0.2 contain a missing bounds check in the ATT layer write request handler that allows a remote, unauthenticated BLE client to corrupt memory in the ATTClass global object. Devices running ArduinoBLE with one or more characteristics configured with the BLEEncryption property are affected. The fix is included starting from the 2.0.2 release. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ecryptfs: pass packet set buffer size to parser
ecryptfs_parse_packet_set() receives a pointer into the file header, but
it calculates the remaining packet buffer size from PAGE_SIZE - 8. For
version 1 headers the packet set starts later in the header, so this can
overstate the available buffer.
Pass the actual packet set buffer length from the caller and calculate
per-packet limits from the remaining bytes in that buffer. Recompute the
remaining length after consuming a tag 3 packet before parsing the
following tag 11 packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Reject krb5 v2 wrap tokens with oversized ec field
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() sets buf->len to a logical
length, which can be much smaller than head[0].iov_len
(the allocated receive-page capacity). It then calls
xdr_buf_trim() with a trim length derived from the 16-bit
"extra count" (ec) field in the Kerberos v2 token header.
The ec field is authenticated by the post-decrypt memcmp()
against the encrypted header copy, so a randomly-mutated
value is rejected. However, any peer holding a valid GSS
context can legitimately encrypt a token whose ec exceeds
the plaintext length. Per RFC 4121, such a token is
structurally malformed.
Although xdr_buf_trim() now clamps the buf->len subtraction
to avoid unsigned underflow, the buffer is still left in a
semantically invalid state (zero length, inconsistent iov
lengths) when ec is oversized.
Reject these tokens before calling xdr_buf_trim(), giving
callers a well-defined GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN error and
keeping the xdr_buf internally consistent. The wrapped blob
begins at a nonzero offset -- both callers pass len as
offset + opaque_len -- so buf->len still counts the offset
bytes that precede the blob. Compare the trim length
against the remaining wrapped segment, buf->len - offset,
rather than the whole buffer; comparing against buf->len
alone leaves an offset-wide window in which an oversized ec
passes the test and xdr_buf_trim() cuts into the bytes ahead
of the blob. |
| There is an Improper Encryption Configuration Vulnerability in some Hikvision Intercom Products. This could allow attackers to forge M1 cards. |
| Incorrect calculation of buffer size in Windows iSCSI allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| eprosima Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group). Versions prior to 2.6.12, 2.14.6, 3.2.4, 3.3.1, and 3.4.2 have a remotely triggerable Out-of-Bounds Read while processing RTPS `DATA_FRAG` submessages. An attacker can craft a `DATA_FRAG` with a large `sampleSize` but a small actual payload, and set `fragmentsInSubmessage` such that the receiver treats the packet as the LAST fragment**. In this LAST-fragment path, Fast-DDS computes `incoming_length` based on `sampleSize` and calls `memcpy()` without validating `incoming_data.length >= incoming_length`. As a result, `CacheChange_t::add_fragments()` reads past the received UDP datagram buffer and into adjacent heap memory, copying those bytes into the reassembly buffer. In a Discovery Server deployment, the resulting `CacheChange_t` can be relayed to other participants, meaning that a newly joining participant may receive leaked heap memory (e.g., pointer values that could aid ASLR bypass). Versions 2.6.12, 2.14.6, 3.2.4, 3.3.1, and 3.4.2 fix the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: pull headers in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()
Most ndo_start_xmit() methods expects headers of gso packets
to be already in skb->head.
net/core/tso.c users are particularly at risk, because tso_build_hdr()
does a memcpy(hdr, skb->data, hdr_len);
qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() already does a dissection of gso packets.
Use pskb_may_pull() instead of skb_header_pointer() to make
sure drivers do not have to reimplement this.
Some malicious packets could be fed, detect them so that we can
drop them sooner with a new SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO drop_reason. |
| Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5. |
| GIMP HDR File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of GIMP. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of HDR files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-28266. |
| A flaw was found in popt. This vulnerability allows an attacker to provide specially crafted configuration content to a host, which, when loaded, can lead to a small memory corruption issue. This occurs because of an error in how the `poptConfigFileToString` function reallocates memory for buffers. Successful exploitation could result in heap metadata corruption, potentially causing the affected process to become unavailable (denial of service). |
| An incorrect buffer size calculation in the Windows Interactive Service in OpenVPN 2.7_alpha1 through 2.7.6 allows local authenticated users to cause memory corruption or disclose sensitive information via crafted NRPT inputs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows
ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() decompresses an RFC 6554 Source Routing Header, swaps
the next segment into ipv6_hdr->daddr, recompresses, then pulls the old
header and pushes the new one plus the IPv6 header back. The
recompressed header can be larger than the received one when the swap
reduces the common-prefix length the segments share with daddr (CmprI=0,
CmprE>0, seg[0][0] != daddr[0] gives the maximum +8 bytes).
pskb_expand_head() was gated on segments_left == 0, so on earlier
segments the push consumed unchecked headroom. Once skb_push() leaves
fewer than skb->mac_len bytes in front of data,
skb_mac_header_rebuild()'s call to:
skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len);
will store (data - head) - mac_len into the u16 mac_header field, which
wraps to ~65530, and the following memmove() writes mac_len bytes ~64KiB
past skb->head.
A single AF_INET6/SOCK_RAW/IPV6_HDRINCL packet over lo with a two
segment type-3 SRH (CmprI=0, CmprE=15) reaches headroom 8 after one
pass; KASAN reports a 14-byte OOB write in ipv6_rthdr_rcv.
Fix this by expanding the head whenever the remaining room is less than
the push size plus mac_len, and request that much extra so the rebuilt
MAC header fits afterwards. |
| A flaw was found in libssh. Incorrect AES-GCM finalization checks in builds using the OpenSSL backend can effectively remove integrity protection, allowing an in-path attacker to modify plaintext on the wire without detection. |
| GIMP TIF File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of GIMP. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of TIF files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-29404. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the GIMP DDS (DirectDraw Surface) file parser. When a crafted DDS file declares a D3D9 pixel format but sets a lower bits-per-pixel (bpp) value in the header, the loader allocates an undersized heap buffer. Subsequent pixel data consumption at the real format's stride causes a write past the heap buffer boundary, leading to heap metadata corruption and potential code execution. |
| A flaw was found in rsyslog. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow in the RainerScript `replace()` function by sending specially crafted syslog messages. This vulnerability arises from an incorrect buffer size calculation during string replacement, causing memory corruption. Successful exploitation can lead to a denial of service (DoS) for the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/mm: use physical alignment for vmemmap_start_pfn
RISC-V computes vmemmap_start_pfn by rounding phys_ram_base down to
VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. That alignment must therefore be expressed in the
physical-address domain.
Commit 476849b0fba4 ("riscv/mm: align vmemmap to maximal folio size")
attempted to account for the maximal folio alignment by feeding
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN directly into VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. However,
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN is measured in bytes of struct page storage,
whereas VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN is used to align a physical address.
The mask-based compound_info encoding requires pfn_to_page(0) to be
naturally aligned to MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN. Commit 9f94db4c7eaa
("mm/sparse: check memmap alignment for compound_info_has_mask()") added a
check for that requirement and exposed the unit mismatch on systems such
as QEMU virt, where the DRAM base is not aligned to MAX_FOLIO_NR_PAGES *
PAGE_SIZE.
Here is the log:
[ 0.000000][ C0] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000][ C0] WARNING: mm/sparse.c:365 at sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe, CPU#0: swapper/0
[ 0.000000][ C0] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-g1d8304bdd65f #2 PREEMPT
[ 0.000000][ C0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] ra : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : ffffffff86851c88 ra : ffffffff86851c88 sp : ffffffff88807a30
[ 0.000000][ C0] gp : ffffffff8a3bf240 tp : ffffffff88842080 t0 : ff600000ffab6000
[ 0.000000][ C0] t1 : 000000017fab6000 t2 : 65203a6573726363 s0 : ffffffff88807bc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s1 : 000000000e000000 a0 : 0000000000000007 a1 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff86851c88 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a5 : ffffffff88843080 a6 : 0000000000000003 a7 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s2 : ff60000000000000 s3 : 0040000000000000 s4 : 0004000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s5 : ffffffff8a4d92e0 s6 : ff600000ffab55e0 s7 : ffffffff88384d00
[ 0.000000][ C0] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff88384cc1 s10: ffffffff88384cc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s11: ffffffff8a4daae0 t3 : ffffffff915e8b20 t4 : ffffffff915e8b20
[ 0.000000][ C0] t5 : ffffffff915e8b20 t6 : ffffffff915e8bc8 ssp : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff86851c88 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86851c88>] sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff8683d396>] mm_core_init_early+0x116/0x1e30
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86801edc>] start_kernel+0xd2/0x848
Convert MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN to the equivalent physical alignment
before using it in VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. This keeps the existing
round_down() logic while making the resulting vmemmap base satisfy the
mask-alignment requirement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path
In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken
(MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are
computed as
alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When
fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero.
The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past
the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is
therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the
same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing
skb_shared_info.
An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using
MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES.
The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6:
avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix
__ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative
copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed
MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption
triggerable.
The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts
for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by
adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.
After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the
paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic.
Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path
tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb
allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent
netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom
smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len
negative.
Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it
for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb
construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().
The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and
header_ops->create is not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - block s_input when F54 queue is busy
Changing the input (diagnostic report type) mid-stream changes the
report size. Since V4L2 buffers are allocated based on the size at
stream start, changing the input while streaming could lead to a
heap buffer overflow if the new size is larger than the allocated
buffers.
Prevent this by blocking VIDIOC_S_INPUT with -EBUSY if the V4L2 queue
is busy (streaming). |
