| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data
byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private
data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which
dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing
with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been
freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while
the disconnect is in progress.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for
a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: fix potential divide-by-zero when num_vsi is zero
For i.MX94 series, all the standalone ENETCs do not support SR-IOV, so
pf->caps.num_vsi is zero. This leads to a divide-by-zero in
enetc4_default_rings_allocation() when distributing rings among PF and
VFs.
Division by zero is undefined behavior in C. On ARM64, the UDIV/SDIV
instructions silently return zero rather than raising an exception, so
the issue does not cause a visible crash. However, relying on this
behavior is incorrect and poses a cross-platform compatibility risk.
Add an explicit check for num_vsi == 0 and return early after the PF's
rings have been configured. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Selectively expand io_mutex
The io_mutex was defined to serialize the io_regions, but then has
also sort of been associated with the I/O themselves because of
the close relationship they share.
With the handful of races that are possible, the choices are either to:
A) expand the scope of io_mutex to close these remaining windows, or
B) reduce the scope of io_mutex to just io_region, and introduce a new
lock mechanism for the remaining I/O resources
This patch implements A, since B brings with it a lot more interactions
that would need to be tracked and kept in a correct hierarchy. It also
takes advantage of the workqueue element for cp_free() that now gets
called out of fsm_notoper(), which could be invoked out of an interrupt
context and thus cannot acquire a mutex itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant
The first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary
like all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate
the size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL.
Verify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between
reads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Cancel existing workqueues
The initialization of the io_work and crw_work workqueues begs the
question of whether they should be un-initialized. Add the corresponding
cleanup tags in _release_dev to ensure work isn't dispatched after
the private struct is free'd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: fix refcount race between list:set GC and swap
__ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU,
then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set->ref.
ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list
slots and the two sets' ref counters, so it can interleave between the
dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a
set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit
BUG_ON(set->ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq,
which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring
list:set member calls list_set_del() -> ip_set_put_byindex() while
IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets.
Resolve the index and decrement under ip_set_ref_lock, as ip_set_swap()
already does, keeping the refcount tied to the index rather than to a
stale set pointer.
kernel BUG at net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:685!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ip_set_put_byindex (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:870)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
list_set_del (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:159)
set_cleanup_entries (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:181)
list_set_gc (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:578)
call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1748)
__run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2374)
run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:2405)
</IRQ>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| Race condition in WebProtect in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in Extensions in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Race condition in Enterprise in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed an adjacent attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Tor before 0.4.9.11 is prone to a race condition where in just the right circumstances a rendezvous point could man-in-the-middle (impersonate) the onion service that the client was trying to reach. |
| OpenTelemetry-Go is the Go implementation of OpenTelemetry. From version 0.11.0 through 1.44.0, the OpenTracing bridge's bridgeSpan contains an unsynchronized extraBaggageItems map which can cause a panic. Because Go maps are not safe for concurrent read/write access, concurrent SetBaggageItem and correlation.MapFromContext calls on the same hooked bridgeSpan can trigger a fatal runtime error—such as concurrent map read and map write or concurrent map iteration and map write—terminating the process and causing denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.45.0. |
| HCL IntelliOps Event Management (IEM) is affected by a race condition. A "timing window" can occur where an attacker can modify the resource causing unpredictable behavior. |
| Race condition in Payments in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in ReadAloud in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Race condition in `check.jst` in RDK-B WebUI `rdkb-2025q4-kirkstone.04.10.26` allows a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access via concurrent authentication requests that exploit shared authentication state. |
| Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in Apache Tomcat when creating unix domain sockets allows an unauthorised local user to access the unix domain socket.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.24, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.57, from 9.0.42 through 9.0.120.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.25, 10.1.58, 9.0.121, which fixes the issue. |
| Race condition in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: publish queues before arming timer
inet_frag_create() arms the fragment queue timer before inserting the
queue into the fqdir rhashtable. If the namespace fragment timeout is
zero or negative, the timer can run before the queue is published.
The timer callback then marks the queue complete, tries to remove a node
that is not in the hash table yet, and drops the anticipated hash
reference. Creation can subsequently publish the completed queue without
restoring that reference, leaving a stale hash node after the caller drops
the remaining reference.
Publish the queue first and arm the timer while holding the queue lock.
This makes timer expiry wait until the queue is visible in the hash table,
so inet_frag_kill() can remove the node and balance the hash reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: fastrpc: Remove buffer from list prior to unmap operation
fastrpc_req_munmap_impl() is called to unmap any buffer. The buffer is
getting removed from the list after it is unmapped from DSP. This can
create potential race conditions if multiple threads invoke unmap
concurrently, where one thread may remove the entry from the list while
another thread's unmap operation is still ongoing.
Fix this by removing the buffer entry from the list before calling the
unmap operation. If the unmap fails, the entry is re-added to the list
so that userspace can retry the unmap, or alternatively, the buffer
will be cleaned up during device release when the DSP process is torn
down and all DSP-side mappings are freed along with remaining buffers
in the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix huge_zero_pfn race
Patch series "mm/huge_memory: fix huge_zero_pfn race", v2.
There is a subtle race in the reference-counted huge_zero_folio
implementation.
The fast path atomic logic fails to account for the fact that the shrinker
(which drops the final huge_zero_refcount pin) can overwrite huge_zero_pfn
with the ~0UL sentinel value in shrink_huge_zero_folio_scan() after a
racing get_huge_zero_folio() installed a valid value there.
This results in huge_zero_folio being correctly set but huge_zero_pfn
being set incorrectly and thus is_huge_zero_pfn() and consequently
is_huge_zero_pmd() will misidentify the huge zero folio as being an
ordinary THP folio.
This can result in the huge zero folio being split and otherwise treated
incorrectly.
The solution to this is very subtle as there is an atomic fast path, and
thus ordering in weakly ordered architectures has to be treated very
carefully.
The first commit fixes the issue by introducing a spinlock around
huge_zero_[pfn, folio, refcount] write, with careful consideration paid to
load/store ordering in the fast path. It is placed first and kept as
small as possible so that it can be backported on its own.
The second commit is a pure cleanup which reworks the
CONFIG_PERSISTENT_HUGE_ZERO_FOLIO logic to better separate the persistent
logic from the dynamically allocated one.
This patch (of 2):
If !CONFIG_PERSISTENT_HUGE_ZERO_FOLIO, the huge_zero_folio is refcounted
by huge_zero_refcount and returned by mm_get_huge_zero_folio().
When the caller is done with the huge zero page, its reference count is
decremented. Only a shrinker can set the reference count to zero.
A race can unfortunately occur between a shrinker decrementing the
reference count to zero and a concurrent page fault.
This is because shrink_huge_zero_folio_scan() might, if very unlucky, be
preempted between setting huge_zero_refcount to zero and writing an
invalid value.
During this time get_huge_zero_folio() could write to huge_zero_pfn before
shrink_huge_zero_folio_scan() resumes.
In this event the huge zero folio will be persistently misidentified
causing the THP code path to be entered inappropriately for the huge zero
folio:
CPU 0 CPU 1
=======================================|=================================
shrink_huge_zero_folio_scan() |
atomic_cmpxchg() sets refcount to 0 |
xchg() sets huge_zero_folio to NULL | get_huge_zero_folio()
| | atomic_inc_not_zero() -> zero
preempted for a long time | Allocate new huge zero folio
| | Write valid huge_zero_folio
v | Write valid huge_zero_pfn
Overwrite huge_zero_pfn with ~0UL <--- Invalid overwrite!
This results in is_huge_zero_pfn() and is_huge_zero_pmd() incorrectly
returning false for a huge zero page which could result in issues like the
huge zero folio being incorrectly split.
Note that the issue is with huge_zero_pfn not huge_zero_folio, as
get_huge_zero_folio() uses cmpxchg() gated on huge_zero_folio being NULL
with a retry loop and shrink_huge_zero_folio_scan() uses xchg() to set
huge_zero_folio.
Fix the issue by introducing a spinlock, huge_zero_lock, to prevent
concurrent write of huge_zero_folio, huge_zero_pfn and huge_zero_refcount.
There needs to be significant care taken here to ensure correctness:
The fast path in get_huge_zero_folio() uses atomic_inc_not_zero(), which
is outside of the critical section, and means huge zero allocation is
gated on zero huge_zero_refcount.
The fast path doesn't use huge_zero_lock, so the critical section is
irrelevant to it.
So invariants are required - huge_zero_refcount MUST:
* Only be set in the huge_zero_lock critical section to ensure
serialisation of huge_zero_pfn, huge_zero_folio and
---truncated--- |
