| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/dibs: Correct freeing of dmb_clientid_arr
A dibs device interrupt handler can be active after dibs_dev_del() and
may still access dmb_clientid_arr. (UAF)
In case of a failure in dibs_dev_add() being called by dibs_lo_dev_probe()
dmb_clientid_arr is freed twice (double free).
Free dmb_clientid_arr in dibs_dev_release() after last reference is gone.
Note that allocating in dibs_dev_add() instead of dibs_dev_alloc() is ok
for now, because no dmbs can be registered before dibs_dev_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: smc: fix splice entry lifetime imbalance in smc_rx_splice
smc_rx_splice() passes pages to splice_to_pipe() before taking the
references that cover the lifetime of each splice entry. In the
VM-backed RMB path, splice_to_pipe() may drop unqueued entries through
smc_rx_spd_release(), while queued entries are released later via the
pipe buffer callback.
The old post-splice accounting also derives the number of queued VM pages
from an offset mutated while building the descriptor, and a multi-page
splice pairs one sock_hold() with multiple sock_put() calls.
Take the page and socket references for every candidate entry before
splice_to_pipe(), and drop the matching private state, page reference,
and socket reference from smc_rx_spd_release() for entries that never
get queued. This fixes a refcount imbalance that can underflow page
refcounts and trigger a use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Prevent subbuf order change when resizing is disabled
Because ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() frees buffer pages, we can't
allow it when resizing is disabled. A non-consuming reader is at risk of
use-after-free (rb_advance_iter()).
Return -EBUSY on resize_disabled, matching ring_buffer_resize()
behaviour. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebt_nflog: pin the NFLOG backend
nf_log_unregister() runs after the per-net teardown so its final RCU
grace period also drains readers that obtained the logger from a per-net
binding. However, ebt_nflog passes an explicit ULOG log type to
nf_log_packet() without holding a reference on the selected logger module,
unlike the xt_NFLOG and nft_log frontends.
An ebtables nflog rule can therefore remain callable while nfnetlink_log
is unloaded. The resulting interleaving is:
CPU 0 CPU 1
nfnetlink_log_fini()
unregister_pernet_subsys()
kfree(nfnl_log_pernet(net))
ebt_nflog_tg()
nf_log_packet()
nfulnl_log_packet()
instance_lookup_get_rcu()
The global ULOG logger is still registered at this point, so CPU 1
dereferences the per-net state after CPU 0 has freed it. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instance_lookup_get_rcu
Read of size 8 at addr ff110001052e6210 by task poc/92
Call Trace:
instance_lookup_get_rcu+0x1ce/0x1f0 [nfnetlink_log]
nfulnl_log_packet+0x248/0x2fb0 [nfnetlink_log]
nf_log_packet+0x204/0x300
ebt_nflog_tg+0x351/0x550
ebt_do_table+0xedf/0x22b0
Allocated by task 90:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x186/0x470
ops_init+0x6d/0x420
register_pernet_operations+0x2f6/0x670
register_pernet_subsys+0x23/0x40
Freed by task 93:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
ops_undo_list+0x3e3/0x700
unregister_pernet_operations+0x232/0x490
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
nfnetlink_log_fini+0x34/0x450 [nfnetlink_log]
Acquire the ULOG logger module reference when an ebt_nflog rule is
validated and release it when the rule is destroyed. Request the NFLOG
backend for legacy callers when needed, matching xt_NFLOG. This prevents
module teardown until all ebt_nflog rules have stopped using the logger. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: do not arm the ageing timer on a device that is down
vxlan_changelink() arms vxlan->age_timer whenever the requested ageing
interval differs from the configured one:
if (conf.age_interval != vxlan->cfg.age_interval)
mod_timer(&vxlan->age_timer, jiffies);
There is no netif_running() test, so the timer is armed even on a device
that was never brought up. The only synchronous cancel in the driver is
the timer_delete_sync() in vxlan_stop(), which is .ndo_stop.
netif_close_many() drops devices without IFF_UP before
__dev_close_many() runs, so that cancel is skipped for such a device.
vxlan_setup() sets dev->needs_free_netdev = true and age_timer is a
member of struct vxlan_dev, so free_netdev() releases the allocation the
timer lives in while it is still queued on a timer_base.
expire_timers() unlinks the entry before it loads timer->function, so
the timer core writes through the freed object's list pointers:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x208/0x654
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00001adace68 by task true/192
__asan_store8+0x84/0xac
__run_timers+0x208/0x654
run_timer_softirq+0x154/0x18c
Allocated by task 189:
alloc_netdev_mqs+0x64/0x720
rtnl_create_link+0x4ac/0x520
rtnl_newlink+0x758/0xd00
Freed by task 191:
netdev_release+0x40/0x58
netdev_run_todo+0x4a4/0x8c0
rtnl_dellink+0x200/0x4e8
The rtnl operations involved are netns-scoped, so an unprivileged user
can perform them in a new user and network namespace.
Arming the timer on a down device never had an effect: vxlan_cleanup()
returns early on !netif_running(), and vxlan_open() arms the timer for
any non-zero interval once the device is brought up. Add the missing
test.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec()
eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop
position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances
by reading list.next from the removed child.
If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu
union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read.
The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed
child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running.
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to save the next sibling before recursively
removing the current child. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: clear suppressed fib6 rule result
fib6_rule_suppress() drops a suppressed route with ip6_rt_put_flags(),
but leaves res->rt6 pointing at the released rt6_info.
If no later rule supplies a replacement, fib6_rule_lookup() still sees
res.rt6 and returns that stale dst to its caller. A suppressing rule can
therefore leak a released route back to rt6_lookup(), and the next put
hits rcuref_put_slowpath() from dst_release().
Clear res->rt6 when suppressing the route so suppressed lookups fall
through to the null dst instead of reusing the released one. |
| A flaw was found in WebKitGTK. Processing malicious web content can cause a use-after-free issue due to improper memory handling and result in memory corruption. |
| Use-After-Free vulnerability in a zircon kernel pager proxy (Fuchsia), which could lead to a Privilege Escalation from Userspace to Kernel (AP) |
| The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.5, macOS Sonoma 14.8.5, macOS Tahoe 26.4. Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app termination. |
| A use-after-free condition exists in pglogical's worker signaling code, where a worker structure can be dereferenced after the underlying slot has been freed or recycled during normal worker lifecycle events. The condition is reachable during normal replication operation, including by a low-privileged user able to influence worker start, stop, and restart timing through permitted pglogical operations. In the typical case the condition crashes replication workers, causing an availability impact. In the worst case a use-after-free in a PostgreSQL backend can be leveraged as a remote code execution primitive at the privilege of that backend. |
| IBM AIX 7.2, and 7.3 and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to a use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: restrict socket queue dumps in enqueue tracepoints
tipc_sk_enqueue() runs with sk->sk_lock.slock held while the socket is
owned by user context. The spinlock protects the backlog queue in this
path, but it does not serialize against the socket owner consuming or
purging sk_receive_queue.
KASAN reported:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1050 Comm: tipc3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6+ #126 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 lib/dump_stack.c:123
print_report+0xce/0x5b0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:597
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380
tipc_skb_dump+0x1327/0x16f0 net/tipc/trace.c:73
tipc_list_dump+0x208/0x2e0 net/tipc/trace.c:187
tipc_sk_dump+0xaf6/0xd60 net/tipc/socket.c:3996
trace_event_raw_event_tipc_sk_class+0x312/0x5a0 net/tipc/trace.h:188
tipc_sk_rcv+0xb1d/0x1d50 net/tipc/socket.c:2497
tipc_node_xmit+0x1c3/0x1440 net/tipc/node.c:1689
__tipc_sendmsg+0x97a/0x1440 net/tipc/socket.c:1512
tipc_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 net/tipc/socket.c:1400
sock_sendmsg+0x2f6/0x3e0 net/socket.c:825
splice_to_socket+0x7f9/0x1010 fs/splice.c:884
do_splice+0xe21/0x2330 fs/splice.c:936
__do_splice+0x153/0x260 fs/splice.c:1431
__x64_sys_splice+0x150/0x230 fs/splice.c:1616
x64_sys_call+0xeb5/0x2790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x620 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130
RIP: 0033:0x71624e8aafe2
Code: 08 0f 85 71 3a ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66
RSP: 002b:0000716157ffed68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000113
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000716157fff6c0 RCX: 000071624e8aafe2
RDX: 000000000000005f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000066
RBP: 0000716157ffed90 R08: 0000000000008000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffff00
R13: 0000000000000021 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff89799c40
</TASK>
The TIPC_DUMP_ALL tracepoints in tipc_sk_enqueue() also dump
sk_receive_queue and can therefore dereference skbs that the socket
owner has already dequeued or freed. Restrict these dumps to
TIPC_DUMP_SK_BKLGQ, which matches the queue protected by the held
spinlock.
Keep the change limited to the enqueue path, where the unsafe queue dump
is reachable while the socket is owned by user context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas_tf: fix use-after-free in lbtf_free_adapter()
lbtf_free_adapter() calls timer_delete(&priv->command_timer), which does
not wait for a running command_timer_fn() callback. lbtf_free_adapter()
runs on the teardown path right before ieee80211_free_hw() frees priv,
both in lbtf_remove_card() and in the probe error path. command_timer is
armed by mod_timer() in lbtf_cmd() whenever a firmware command is sent.
command_timer_fn() dereferences priv. If a command times out as the
device is removed, command_timer_fn() runs concurrently with teardown and
dereferences priv after it has been freed.
This is the same use-after-free that commit 03cc8f90d053 ("wifi: libertas:
fix use-after-free in lbs_free_adapter()") fixed in the sibling libertas
driver. The libertas_tf variant has the identical pattern and was left
unchanged. Use timer_delete_sync() so any in-flight callback completes
before priv is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Fix double-add of pseudo-locked region's RMID to free list
A pseudo-locked group's RMID is freed when it is created. On unmount
rmdir_all_sub() unconditionally frees all RMID of all groups, resulting
in a double-free of the pseudo-locked group's RMID. The consequence of this
is that the original free results in the pseudo-locked group's RMID being
added to the rmid_free_lru linked list and the second free then attempts
to add the same RMID entry to the rmid_free_lru again.
Do not double-free a pseudo-locked group's RMID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule
drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()
and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free ->
wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending
or running during removal can outlive drvr.
Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work
callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe
brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset ->
brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for
the running work and deadlock.
Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through
brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is
marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls
brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing
and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes
the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming
path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in
the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail
path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in
sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the
firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;
on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which
also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is
initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees
drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;
resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.
Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire
before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr
(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.
The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to
every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),
SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the
debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending
bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the
scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released
those DMA buffers.
This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does
not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the
asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That
callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked
separately.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: esd_usb: kill anchored URBs before freeing netdevs
esd_usb_disconnect() frees each CAN netdev with free_candev() inside
its per-netdev loop and only calls unlink_all_urbs(dev) afterwards.
The per-netdev private data (struct esd_usb_net_priv) is embedded in
the net_device allocation returned by alloc_candev(), so once
free_candev() has run, dev->nets[i] points to freed memory.
unlink_all_urbs() then dereferences the freed dev->nets[i] to kill the
per-netdev TX anchor (usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted)),
clear active_tx_jobs, and reset priv->tx_contexts[].
Reorder the teardown so the anchored URBs are killed before the netdevs
are freed, matching other CAN/USB drivers in the same directory such as
ems_usb, usb_8dev and mcba_usb, which unregister, then unlink, then
free: unregister the netdevs first (which stops their TX queues), call
unlink_all_urbs(dev) once, then free the netdevs.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: udc: bdc: free IRQ and drain func_wake_notify before teardown
The Broadcom BDC UDC driver registers its IRQ handler with
devm_request_irq() in bdc_udc_init(), so the IRQ is released by devm
only after bdc_remove() returns. devm releases resources in reverse
LIFO order, but bdc_remove() runs bdc_udc_exit() and bdc_hw_exit() ->
bdc_mem_free() manually before returning: bdc_udc_exit() tears down
individual endpoint objects via bdc_free_ep(), while bdc_hw_exit() ->
bdc_mem_free() frees and NULLs the DMA-coherent status-report ring
(bdc->srr.sr_bds) and kfree()s bdc->bdc_ep_array. Both happen while
the IRQ handler (bdc_udc_interrupt, requested with IRQF_SHARED)
remains deliverable in the window up to the post-remove devm
free_irq().
On receipt of a shared interrupt in that window, bdc_udc_interrupt()
dereferences bdc->srr.sr_bds[bdc->srr.dqp_index] (NULL or freed DMA)
and dispatches sr_handler callbacks that index into bdc_ep_array,
causing a NULL-deref or use-after-free.
The same window affects the delayed_work bdc->func_wake_notify, which is
armed from the IRQ handler via bdc_sr_uspc() -> handle_link_state_change()
-> schedule_delayed_work() and may self-rearm from its own callback
bdc_func_wake_timer(). No cancel exists anywhere in the driver, so a
queued work item that fires after bdc_remove() returns and the bdc
structure is devm-freed dereferences freed memory.
Replace devm_request_irq() with request_irq() and add an explicit
free_irq(bdc->irq, bdc) in bdc_remove(). Clear BDC_GIE before
free_irq() to stop the device from asserting interrupts, then
free_irq() drains any in-flight handler, then cancel_delayed_work_sync()
drains the func_wake_notify delayed work. This ordering ensures the
IRQ handler and delayed work cannot interfere with the subsequent
endpoint and DMA teardown in bdc_udc_exit() and bdc_hw_exit(). Wire the
matching free_irq() into the bdc_udc_init() error path so the IRQ is
released on probe failure, and route the bdc_init_ep() failure through
err0 instead of returning directly.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast()
bond_xmit_broadcast() reuses the original skb for the last slave
(determined by bond_is_last_slave()) and clones it for others.
Concurrent slave enslave/release can mutate the slave list during
RCU-protected iteration, changing which slave is "last" mid-loop.
This causes the original skb to be double-consumed (double-freed).
Replace the racy bond_is_last_slave() check with a simple index
comparison (i + 1 == slaves_count) against the pre-snapshot slave
count taken via READ_ONCE() before the loop. This preserves the
zero-copy optimization for the last slave while making the "last"
determination stable against concurrent list mutations.
The UAF can trigger the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_clone
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ef8d40 by task exploit/147
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 147 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)
skb_clone (include/linux/skbuff.h:1724 include/linux/skbuff.h:1792 include/linux/skbuff.h:3396 net/core/skbuff.c:2108)
bond_xmit_broadcast (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5334)
bond_start_xmit (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5567 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5593)
dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5325 include/linux/netdevice.h:5334 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887)
__dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:3601 net/core/dev.c:4838)
ip6_finish_output2 (include/net/neighbour.h:540 include/net/neighbour.h:554 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136)
ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:208 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:219)
ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:250)
ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1985)
udp_v6_send_skb (net/ipv6/udp.c:1442)
udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1733)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 147:
Freed by task 147:
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100ef8c80
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of
freed 224-byte region [ffff888100ef8c80, ffff888100ef8d60)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100ef8c00: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888100ef8c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100ef8d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888100ef8d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100ef8e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
================================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Protect mgmt_pending list with its own lock
This uses a mutex to protect from concurrent access of mgmt_pending
list which can cause crashes like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91
Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000c48885b2 by task syz.4.334/7318
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7318 Comm: syz.4.334 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-g187899f4124a #0 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
__dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94
dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0xa8/0x254 mm/kasan/report.c:408
print_report+0x68/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xb0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379
hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91
mgmt_pending_find+0x7c/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:223
pending_find net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:947 [inline]
remove_adv_monitor+0x44/0x1a4 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5445
hci_mgmt_cmd+0x780/0xc00 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x544/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x25c/0x378 net/socket.c:1131
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:591 [inline]
vfs_write+0x62c/0x97c fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_write+0x120/0x210 fs/read_write.c:736
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:747 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:744 [inline]
__arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:744
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Allocated by task 7037:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:562
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xb4 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4327 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2fc/0x4c8 mm/slub.c:4339
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline]
sk_prot_alloc+0xc4/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2198
sk_alloc+0x44/0x3ac net/core/sock.c:2254
bt_sock_alloc+0x4c/0x300 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:148
hci_sock_create+0xa8/0x194 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:2202
bt_sock_create+0x14c/0x24c net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132
__sock_create+0x43c/0x91c net/socket.c:1541
sock_create net/socket.c:1599 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1636 [inline]
__sys_socket+0xd4/0x1c0 net/socket.c:1683
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1697 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1695 [inline]
__arm64_sys_socket+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1695
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Freed by task 6607:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x68/0x88 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline
---truncated--- |
