| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Event Logging Service allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows NTFS allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In get_eht_operation_channel_width of ieee802_11_common.c, there is a possible out of bounds read due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to remote (proximal/adjacent) information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| An insufficient input validation vulnerability in the listed NETGEAR RAX series models allows a network-adjacent attacker having network access (such as WiFi credentials) to crash the router's management UI. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. A crash of the router's management UI does not impact the availability of the router's core services like WiFi network. |
| Tesseract is an open source OCR engine. In version 5.5.3 and earlier, UNICHARSET::load_via_fgets in src/ccutil/unicharset.cpp trusts the declared unichar count as a loop bound and uses id as an unchecked index into the unichars vector. unichar_insert_backwards_compatible can leave the vector unchanged for an empty, duplicate, or already-encodable representation, causing id to become larger than unichars.size(). Subsequent set_* calls and the write to unichars[id].properties.enabled then write UNICHAR_PROPERTIES beyond the vector during initialization in both the default LSTM and legacy engines, causing heap corruption, a crash, or potentially controlled corruption. No fixed release is available as of this review. |
| Tesseract is an open source OCR engine. In version 5.5.3 and earlier, Classify::ReadNormProtos in src/classify/normmatch.cpp parses the NORMPROTO component of a .traineddata file and uses std::istream::operator>>(char*) to extract a whitespace-delimited token into a fixed 61-byte stack buffer without setting a stream width. The 100-byte line buffer can carry a token of up to 99 characters, so a token longer than 60 characters writes up to 39 attacker-controlled bytes past the buffer during TessBaseAPI::Init of the legacy engine, causing stack corruption, denial of service, and potentially control-flow hijacking on affected standard-library implementations. Builds using Apple's libc++ C++20 bounded array overload are incidentally protected, while typical libstdc++ builds remain affected. No fixed release is available as of this review. |
| A weakness has been identified in vgmstream up to r2117. This issue affects the function sscanf of the file src/meta/txth.c of the component txth-txtp. This manipulation causes stack-based buffer overflow. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Patch name: 4669d37a6af94866f6f0628678f9f90d46954e8b. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. |
| A flaw has been found in D-Link DIR-895L A1_102b07. This impacts the function sendOffer/sendACK of the file udhcpcd/serverpacket.c of the component udhcpcd. This manipulation causes stack-based buffer overflow. The attack can only be done within the local network. The exploit has been published and may be used. |
| A vulnerability was determined in Tenda HG10 300001138. This issue affects the function formWanRedirect of the file /boaform/formWanRedirect of the component Boa Web Server. Executing a manipulation of the argument if can lead to buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. |
| IBM Db2 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.5 could allow an attacker with the ability to control or impersonate a DRDA server endpoint to execute arbitrary commands on Db2 clients due to a stack-based buffer overflow that improperly copies user-controlled data into a fixed-size stack buffer without bounds checking. |
| GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Prior to version 4.7.0, GoBGP accepts a zero-length AS_PATH during UPDATE decoding and later panics while validating that attribute for a confederation eBGP peer. The vulnerable path is in the BGP UPDATE validator: a malformed UPDATE that should be rejected as a malformed AS_PATH instead reaches an unchecked `p.Value[0]` access, allowing a configured confederation eBGP peer to trigger a denial of service. Version 4.7.0 patches the issue. |
| ArduinoCore-avr contains the source code and configuration files of the Arduino AVR Boards platform. A vulnerability in versions prior to 1.8.8 allows an attacker to trigger a stack-based buffer overflow when concatenating floating-point values of sufficiently large magnitude onto an Arduino String object. By passing values near the extremes of the float or double range to `String::concat(float)`, `String::concat(double)`, `String::operator+=()`, or the `+` operator with a float/double operand, `dtostrf()` writes beyond the fixed-size stack buffer, causing memory corruption and denial of service. Under specific conditions, this could enable arbitrary code execution on AVR-based Arduino boards. The fix is included starting from the `1.8.8 `release. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length
nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported
by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response
buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the
response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the
fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an
out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in
fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check.
Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved
devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic
is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/ucs2_string.c: fix out-of-bounds read in ucs2_strnlen()
Patch series "lib/ucs2_string.c: fix out-of-bounds read in
ucs2_strnlen()", v2.
This series fixes an off-by-one out-of-bounds read in ucs2_strnlen().
The first patch is the real fix, the second patch comes as a bonus and
fixes the code indentation.
This patch (of 2):
ucs2_strnlen() checks the current character before checking whether the
caller-provided maximum length has been reached. If the input is not
NUL-terminated within that bound, the loop can read one ucs2_char_t past
the limit.
Test the length before dereferencing to prevent an off-by-one
out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/sysfs: Fix out-of-bounds read in pci_write_legacy_io()
pci_write_legacy_io() loads 4 bytes from the kernfs write buffer
regardless of how many bytes userspace wrote:
if (count != 1 && count != 2 && count != 4)
return -EINVAL;
return pci_legacy_write(bus, off, *(u32 *)buf, count);
kernfs_fop_write_iter() allocates the buffer with kmalloc(len + 1),
so a 1-byte write to the legacy_io sysfs file allocates 2 bytes and
the unconditional u32 load reads up to 2 bytes past the end of the
allocation, which KASAN reports as a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Similarly, a 2-byte write overreads by 1 byte.
Thus, read only the number of bytes requested using get_unaligned_le16()
and get_unaligned_le32() for the 2 and 4 byte cases, interpreting the
buffer as little-endian to match the byte ordering of PCI I/O port
space.
The PowerPC implementation previously compensated for the generic
code's native-endian 32-bit load by shifting the value into place
for the 1 and 2 byte cases. The shifts were only correct on
big-endian kernels.
On little-endian PowerPC (POWER8 and later), they extracted the wrong
bytes, so a 1-byte write wrote an out-of-bounds byte instead of the
requested value. On big-endian, the native load also caused out_le16()
and out_le32() to reverse the user's bytes on the wire for 2 and 4 byte
writes. The little-endian helpers resolve both issues, so the shifts
are removed.
No changes are needed for the Alpha platform.
The legacy_io file is root-only and exists only on Alpha and PowerPC,
the two architectures that define HAVE_PCI_LEGACY. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: rockchip-samsung-dcphy: fix out-of-range max_register
The PHY register block is 64KB, so with a register stride of 4 the
last accessible register sits at offset 0xfffc. max_register names
0x10000, one register past the end of the mapping: dumping the
registers through the regmap debugfs interface reads beyond the
ioremapped region and oopses on the unmapped page. The oops fires
with the regmap lock held, so later PHY operations deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
check has the wrong sign:
if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
embedded in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: validate nseconds in TIME_DELEG decode paths
The xdrgen-based TIME_DELEG_ACCESS and TIME_DELEG_MODIFY decode arms
store a raw uint32_t nseconds directly into tv_nsec without enforcing
nseconds < NSEC_PER_SEC. The legacy nfsd4_decode_nfstime4 has this
check but the TIME_DELEG paths do not. A malformed timespec can
propagate through notify_change() to disk.
Add range checks in both nfs4xdr.c (SETATTR path) and
nfs4callback.c (CB_GETATTR path). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: widen nfsd_genl_rqstp address fields to sockaddr_storage
struct nfsd_genl_rqstp declares rq_daddr and rq_saddr as plain
"struct sockaddr" (16 bytes). When an IPv6 NFS client is connected,
nfsd_genl_rpc_status_compose_msg() casts these fields to
"struct sockaddr_in6 *" (28 bytes) and reads sin6_addr at offset 8..24,
which extends 8 bytes past the end of the 16-byte sockaddr field into
the adjacent rq_flags member. The 16-byte nla_put_in6_addr then ships 8
bytes of truncated IPv6 address followed by 8 bytes of rq_flags to
userspace via the NFSD_A_RPC_STATUS_SADDR6/DADDR6 netlink attributes.
This is reachable by any unprivileged process in the network namespace
because NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET uses GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP without
GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Fix by widening rq_daddr and rq_saddr to struct sockaddr_storage so the
IPv6 casts operate within bounds, copying sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
bytes in the memcpy calls so the full address is captured, and
zero-initializing the genl_rqstp stack variable to prevent leaking
uninitialized tail bytes through netlink. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix XDR padding calculation in ff_encode_getdeviceinfo
nfsd4_ff_encode_getdeviceinfo() computes the da_addr_body reservation
as 16 + netid_len + addr_len, but the subsequent xdr_encode_opaque()
calls emit 8 + round_up(netid_len, 4) + round_up(addr_len, 4) bytes.
The mismatch means the declared da_addr_body length exceeds the actual
encoded data by 2-8 bytes on every flexfile GETDEVICEINFO reply,
leaking stale reply-page content to the client and mis-aligning the
subsequent version list decode.
Use xdr_align_size() for each string length to match what
xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes. |
